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ARTICLES
SAVING LIVES THROUGH PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
JONI HERSCH*
W. Kip VISCUSIt

ABSTRACT
This Article proposes that the value of statisticallife ("VSL ") be used
to set the total damages amount needed for deterrence when punitive
damages are warrantedin wrongful death cases. The appropriatelevel of
total damages should be achieved by adjusting the value of punitive
damages. Compensatory damages should not be distorted to establish the
total damages level needed for efficient deterrence. Attempts to introduce
hedonic damages as a compensatory damages component, and proposals
to use the VSL on a routine basis when setting compensatory damages
awards, are misguided and will undermine the insurance and
compensation functions of compensatory damages. The U.S. Supreme
Court's focus on punitive damages ratios is misplaced, as it is the total
damages amount, not the ratio, that is instrumental. The criteria for
evaluatingpunitive damages in bodily injury cases should be differentfrom
the criteria used in property damage cases. The composition of
compensatory damages is especially important in bodily injury cases.
Empirical analysis of current state court awards in bodily injury cases
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of South Florida; Ph.D. Economics 1981, Northwestern University.
t University Distinguished Professor of Law, Economics, and Management, Vanderbilt
University; A.B. Economics 1971, Harvard University; M.P.P. 1973, Harvard University; A.M.
Economics 1974, Harvard University; Ph.D. Economics 1976, Harvard University.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:229

shows the desired positive relationship between punitive damages awards
and the nonpecuniaryloss.
I. INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages can save lives in an efficient manner.' But at
present, punitive damages are not structured to serve a deterrence function.
In this Article, we propose a methodology for setting punitive damages in
bodily injury cases that will enable punitive damages to fulfill their proper
deterrence role. The primary focus is on wrongful death cases, but the
approach generalizes to other personal injury contexts. The damages
structure we propose to promote efficient levels of safety uses the value of
statistical life ("VSL") to establish the punitive damages award. At the
same time, our proposed use of the VSL does not distort the current role of
compensatory damages. Using our punitive damages framework as a point
of reference, this Article also provides an empirical analysis of punitive
damages awarded in state courts.
The VSL measures the tradeoff between fatality risk and money for
small changes in risk. 2 It is standard practice for government agencies to
use a VSL when assessing the benefits associated with the expected lives
that will be saved by government regulations. 3 Our proposal establishes
1. Punitive damages are designed to punish and serve as a deterrent. A typical example of
punitive damages instructions indicating the punishment and deterrence functions of punitive damages
is that of New Mexico: "Punitive damages are awarded for the limited purposes of punishment and to
deter others from the commission of like offenses." N.M. Uniform Jury Instructions for Civil Cases
§ 13-1827 (West 2009). In this Article, we focus on the deterrence role. In Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, the U.S. Supreme Court cited the following cases as examples of the consensus that deterrence is
the rationale underlying punitive damages: Moskovitz v. Mount Sinai Medical Center, 635 N.E.2d 331,
343 (Ohio 1994) ("The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate a plaintiff, but to punish and
deter certain conduct."); Hamilton Development Co. v. BroadRock Club, Inc., 445 S.E.2d 140, 143 (Va.
1994) (same); Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., 563 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ill.
1990) (same); Green Oil Co. v.
Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 222 (Ala. 1989) (same); and Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566,
570 (Haw. 1989) (same). Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2621 n.9 (2008). The Court
also cited Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (stating
that punitive damages are "intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing"); State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) ("[P]unitive
damages... are aimed at deterrence and retribution."); and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908
cmt. a (1979). Id.
2. W. Kip Viscusi, The Devaluationof Life, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 103, 105 (2009).
3. Id. at 103, 107. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT.
& BUDGET, INFORMING REGULATORY DECISIONS: 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND

BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL
ENTITIES app. A, at 94 (2003) (noting agencies' use of the VSL in calculating costs and benefits of
regulations); Memorandum from Tyler D. Duvall, Assistant Sec'y for Transp. Policy, & D. J. Gribbin,
Gen. Counsel, to Secretarial Officers, Modal Administrators, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Treatment of the
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proper incentives for deterrence in wrongful death cases by linking punitive
damages awards to the VSL rather than to the typically lower value of
compensatory damages.
This Article proposes the following punitive damages formula for
wrongful death cases: the total value of punitive damages plus
compensatory damages should equal the VSL. To achieve this equality,
there should be no change in current practices regarding the value of
compensatory damages. Rather, the entire adjustment should be made to
punitive damages, which should be set to equal the VSL minus the value of
compensatory damages. The Article elaborates on this proposal, indicating
how it can be modified to account for unusually large economic losses and
a low probability of detection.
Advocating the use of the VSL concept in tort damages contexts is not
new, but to date the focus has been on using it to set compensatory
damages rather than punitive damages. There have been many attempts to
use the VSL in the courtroom as what has been termed a "hedonic value of
life," but most jurisdictions have rejected this concept.4 Nevertheless, some
prominent legal scholars have advocated using the VSL as a component of
compensatory damages. As discussed below, Eric Posner and Cass
Sunstein advocate including the VSL as a component of compensatory
damages in addition to currently recognized compensatory damages
categories. 5 Similarly, A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell seek to use
the same punitive damages formula for property damage and bodily injury
cases, which leads them to propose that compensatory damages should
equal the VSL for wrongful death cases, irrespective of whether punitive
damages are warranted.6 This Article will show that use of the VSL to
establish the level of compensatory damages is misguided because it
undermines the current function of compensatory damages.
Economic Value of Statistical Life in Departmental Analyses, available at http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/
policy/reports/080205.htm [hereinafter Duvall & Gribbin Memo] (suggesting how to improve the use of
the VSL); National Center for Environmental Economics, Frequently Asked Questions on Mortality
Risk Valuation, http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/webpagesfMortality%20risk%20valuation.html
(select "Why Does EPA Use a Value of Statistical Life?") (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).
4.
Thomas R. Ireland, Recent Legal Decisions RegardingHedonic Damages: An Update, 13 J.
FoRENSic ECON. 189, 190-92 (2000).
5.
Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 587-90

(2005).
6. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, I Il
HARV. L. REv. 869, 889-90, 941-42 (1998). Under Polinsky and Shavell's proposal, if the probability
of detection is 1.0, then in a wrongful death case there is no rationale for punitive damages from a
deterrence standpoint because their proposal always sets compensatory damages to equal the VSL. Id.
at 891.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:229

The proper setting of deterrence damages in bodily injury cases
requires an approach that is quite different from that used in property
damage cases. Compensatory damages in property damage cases can make
the victim "whole" by reimbursing for the monetary value of the loss, but
this is not so for bodily injury cases. Compensatory damages for wrongful
death or other bodily injury cases cannot ensure that injurers have paid
fully for the harm they have caused. Potential victims would not become
indifferent to the prospect of living or dying merely because they anticipate
compensation for wrongful death, 7 and this point generalizes to severe
bodily injury outcomes as well.8
Correctly incorporating the VSL in setting punitive damages awards in
cases involving bodily injury will often raise punitive damages awards
above current levels. Such an increase may create conflicts with the U.S.
Supreme Court's recently established guidelines regarding the proper ratio
of punitive damages to total compensatory damages, hereinafter referred to
as the "punitive damages ratio." The Court advocated a single-digit ratio as
a reasonable upper limit in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell 9 and more recently reduced10 the desired ratio to 1:1 for maritime
cases in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker.
Application of any such ratio as indicated by the Supreme Court has
three principal shortcomings. First, from the standpoint of deterrence, it is
the total damages amount, not the punitive damages ratio, that is most
consequential. Thus, the ratio concept is not well suited to assessing the
adequacy of punitive damages. Second, it is not appropriate to analyze
property damage cases and bodily injury cases using the same cookie-cutter
ratio approach. The damages relationships appropriate to fulfilling the
deterrence objective of punitive damages are quite different in these two
contexts. Third, such ratio calculations ignore the components of
compensatory damages. Compensatory damages are the sum of economic
7. There may, of course, be some bequest motive, but these values have not been found to be
extremely large relative to the VSL. In particular, the bequest value for workers in hazardous jobs is
"equivalent to a 2.4% chance at another year of life." Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, Models for
Estimating Discount Rates for Long-Term Health Risks Using Labor Market Data, 3 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 381, 399 (1990).
8. The key aspect of severe personal injury cases is that the injury reduces the marginal utility
that the victim can derive from income. W. Kip Viscusi & William N. Evans, Utility Functions That
Depend on Health Status: Estimates and Economic Implications, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 353, 370 (1990).
See also W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering: Damages in Search of a Sounder Rationale, I MICH. L. &
POL'Y REv. 141, 147-56 (1996).
9. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
10. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2633 (2008).
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and noneconomic damages. Because of the difference in the nature of the
harms, noneconomic losses will have a relatively greater role in bodily
injury cases than in property damage cases. In terms of the effect on
punitive damages in bodily injury cases, the noneconomic losses should be
accorded greater weight than the economic damages since the latter
component will tend to understate both the harm caused and the total
damages required for effective deterrence. Our analysis demonstrates that
any such punitive damages ratio as indicated by the Supreme Court is
inappropriate for cases involving bodily injury, and such ratios should not
be applied.
Our empirical analysis, based on data from the Civil Justice Survey of
State Courts 2005,' l demonstrates that the current determinants of punitive
damages are more complex than the relatively blunt punitive damages ratio
approach advocated by the Supreme Court. In particular, our analysis
shows that in bodily injury cases, greater weight is placed on the
noneconomic loss component than on the economic loss value. Such a
disproportionate weight is consistent with our assessment that
noneconomic damages that are appropriate for purposes of compensation
are inadequate from the standpoint of deterrence.
Our proposed punitive damages approach shifts the focus from
admissible punitive damages ratios to the total monetary amount needed for
deterrence. How this can be done is illustrated using examples of wrongful
death cases from state courts. The appropriate deterrence damages value
incorporates information on the VSL, thus providing explicit guidance for
an assessment of punitive damages awards that would otherwise be fraught
with substantial error.
II. THE VALUE OF STATISTICAL LIFE
The economic approach to valuing risks of death yields a dollar value
known as the "value of statistical life," sometimes called the "value of
life. ' '12 The VSL is the rate of tradeoff between money and small risks of
the reductions in
death. Government agencies use this approach to value
13
mortality risk associated with government regulations.
11.
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2005:
available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/
(Jan. 14, 2009),
Codebook
studies/23862?archive=ICPSR&q=23862 [hereinafter CJSSC 2005: Codebook].
12.

See generally W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES

FOR RISK (1992) (using the terminology "value of life"). Recent studies use the terminology "value of
statistical life." See supra note 3.
13.
See supranote 3.
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14
To illustrate the VSL concept, consider the following example.
Suppose a worker is willing to accept a fatality risk of 1/10,000 in return
for an annual wage compensation of $900. The VSL, or the value per unit
risk, is $900 divided by 1/10,000, or $9 million. Viewed somewhat
differently, if 10,000 workers were each exposed to a 1/10,000 risk of death
and each required $900 in compensation to face this risk, there would be a
total of $9 million in compensation paid for the one expected, or statistical,
death. By the same token, these workers would be willing to pay $900 for a
fatality risk reduction of 1/10,000. Thus, the buying price and selling price
for changes in risk are the same for very small changes in risk.

To establish the VSL figures, the government does not rely on such
hypothetical thought experiments, but instead relies primarily on the value
derived from labor market studies of workers' wage-risk tradeoffs. Thus,
the VSL is calculated based on the actual amount of additional wage
compensation that workers receive for fatality risks and the actual level of
these risks.' 5 The estimates of the wage premiums for risk used in these
calculations are based on statistical analyses of large groups of workers that
control for other aspects of the job and worker productivity.
Government agencies that rely on the VSL methodology for
evaluating regulatory proposals use generally similar values, although the
specific VSL figure may differ somewhat by agency. The Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") uses estimates based on reviews of the VSL
literature and selected key studies, with the EPA's Air Office using a VSL
of just under $7 million and other branches of the agency using a VSL as
high as $9 million. 6 Likewise, the Department of Transportation
recommends use of a VSL of $5.8 million based on a somewhat different
set of studies. 17 There will be some differences across studies because of
differences in the samples of workers used and differences in
methodology.' 8 The VSL approach is an accepted methodology within the
economics literature and among government agencies. Dozens of peer
reviewed studies estimating VSLs have been published in major economics
journals, and the Office of Management and Budget has suggested that
14. This example is intended to illustrate the VSL based on a thought experiment rather than
indicating the kinds of statistical studies used to generate the VSL estimates.
15.
See VISCUSI, supra note 12, at 34-42 (providing a survey of VSL literature); W. Kip Viscusi
& Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A CriticalReview of Market Estimates Throughout
the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (2003) (same).
16. See Viscusi, supra note 2, at 113-18 (reviewing the different estimates used by the EPA and
the different studies the EPA took into account).
17. Duvall & Gribbin Memo, supra note 3 (citing Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 15).
18.
These differences are reviewed in Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 15.
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government agencies use the methodology. 19 While the values used by
various government agencies differ and have changed over time, most
agencies now use figures in the range of $5 million to $9 million. 20 Here
2 1
we will focus on the $9 million figure for concreteness.
We emphasize that the VSL is not a measure of a person's lifetime
earnings, but only relates to the tradeoff people are willing to make
between money and very small risks of death. A typical worker's lifetime
earnings will be far less than $9 million. As a numerical example, consider
a worker paid the median weekly earnings for wage and salary workers.
For the first quarter of 2009, this value is $738,22 which will yield an
annual income of $36,900, assuming a fifty-week work year. If the worker
facing the fatality risk is thirty-five years old, there will be twenty-five

years of remaining work-life on average.2 3 At a discount rate of 2 percent,24
the present value of the remaining lifetime earnings amount is
approximately $735,000, or an order of magnitude smaller than the median
VSL. Nevertheless, because the VSL pertains to money tradeoffs for very
19. OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, supra note 3, app. D, at 146-48 (Office of
Management and Budget circular to executive agency heads).
20. As noted above, the Department of Transportation now uses a figure of $5.8 million. Duvall
& Gribbin Memo, supra note 3. The VSL numbers used by agencies have risen over time, as the EPA
uses values in the $7$9 million range. Viscusi, supra note 2, at 115. Other values in 2008 dollars used
by agencies for certain regulations are $6.2 million, by the Consumer Product Safety Commission;
$5.3-$6.8 million, by the Food and Drug Administration; and $3.1-$6.2 million, by the Department of
Homeland Security. Id. at 108 tbl.I.
21. The $9 million figure is also consistent with labor-market studies. Viscusi and Aldy
presented a meta-analysis of the different wage-risk studies and found a median VSL of $7 million.
Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 15, at 63. This value is approximately $8.75 million in 2009 dollars.
According to the Consumer Price Index ("CPI") calculator, $1.00 in the year 2000 is equivalent to
$1.25 in 2009. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator,
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflationcalculator.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2009). For purposes of our
discussion, we will use a VSL of $9 million.
22. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Usual Weekly Earnings of
Wage and Salary Workers: First Quarter 2009, at 1 (Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/archives/wkyeng_04162009.pdf.
23. See KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, at 33 (2004), available at

http://www.usdoj.gov/final-report.pdf (basing work-life estimates on the tables presented in James
Ciecka, Thomas Donley & Jerry Goldman, A Markov ProcessModel of Work-Life Expectancies Based
on Labor Market Activity in 1997-98, J. LEGAL ECON., Winter 1999-00, at 33). Conditional on being a
worker at age thirty-five, the average expected remaining work-life is twenty-five years from age thirtyfive until the worker's death. Work-life estimates are not restricted to consecutive years in the labor
force but also take into account interruptions such as periods of unemployment, disability, and the risk
of death. See Ciecka et al., supra.
24. We assume that income would be paid at the beginning of each year for twenty-five
consecutive years. This assumption is made to simplify the calculations. Recognizing periods of
interruptions in work will defer some income beyond twenty-five years, reducing its present value.
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small risks of death, it is in no way puzzling or inconsistent that workers
with far less than $9 million in resources might make risky job choices that
reflect a VSL of $9 million. It is not the certainty of life or death that is
involved, only minute risks to life.
Clearly the prospect of being paid $9 million after one's death will not
make death a break-even proposition. Such payments will not be enjoyed
while alive, and even if the payments were made before one's death, the
VSL amount would not make a person willing to face certain death. In this
sense, the situation for bodily injury compensation is quite different than
that for property loss. Money and economic goods are replaceable, but life
and health are not. Unlike full compensation for a property loss, the VSL
does not make a victim "whole" after a fatality. Indeed, the VSL is not a
compensation concept at all except with respect to very small changes in
risk level. Workers are not paid $9 million after a fatality, but instead
receive an amount of compensation for exposure to small risk levels before
any harm has occurred. Thus, the VSL is an ex ante amount of
compensation that fully compensates the person for a prospective small
probability of death.
The compensation that workers receive for risk serves an additional
role in market situations by establishing the price of safety for the injurer.
Viewed from the standpoint of a firm, the VSL defines the amount of
money that the firm should be willing to spend to reduce the risk. In the
example above, if it is possible for the firm to eliminate the 1/10,000 risk of
death for less than $900, then it will have a financial incentive to do so. If
the safety improvement costs more than this amount, then it will not
eliminate the risk; it would prefer to pay the worker an additional $900.
While the profit-making calculus performed by the firm may seem harsh,
the attractive aspect of this process is that the individual's own valuation,
observed in the market, establishes the terms of trade. That is, it is the
amount by which the worker exposed to the risk values the reduction of
that risk that establishes the price the firm should be willing to pay to
reduce the risk.
These mechanisms work in parallel fashion in other market contexts.
Consumers are willing to pay less for potentially dangerous products,
whether the product is a car with minimal safety equipment or a house in a
polluted neighborhood. The consumer's valuation of the risk establishes the
incentives for the producer to manufacture safer products. If safety cannot
be enhanced, as with a house where the seller cannot reduce the
neighborhood's pollution level, the buyer will be compensated for the risk
through a lower price.
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In much the same way as the VSL establishes the price of safety when
risks are traded in well-functioning markets, government agencies use the
VSL to determine the stringency of government regulations and to assess
whether any regulations at all are warranted on an economic basis. These
regulations affect how much firms should spend to reduce the risks to
workers, consumers, or the general public. The government policies being
assessed in this manner do not pertain to the certainty of life or death, but
to small changes in risk levels. Using the VSL for benefit assessments sets
the price for safety used by the government in a manner that creates an
economically efficient level of safety.
In this Article, we propose that these same principles of establishing
financial incentives to create efficient levels of safety should likewise be
applied to the courts. In situations involving punitive damages, a prominent
objective is deterrence. But what monetary amount is sufficient to create
deterrence? Once again, the VSL is a central component of any deterrence
task. Continuing our example, the firm that creates a risk will respond to
the economic incentives created by the total award; thus, it is the sum of
punitive damages and compensatory damages that is the key determinant of
safety behavior. Assuming the conduct poses a small risk of death, the
situation can be cast in the same terms as the use of the VSL by
government agencies. Just as the VSL establishes the pertinent price to be
placed on the lives saved by government regulations so that they will create
an efficient level of safety, penalizing the firm based on the VSL will
likewise provide the financial incentives necessary for the injurer to take
care when it is efficient to do so.
While our focus will be on establishing deterrence for situations of
wrongful death, the approach generalizes to bodily injury cases. The
counterpart of the VSL for other injuries is the risk-money tradeoff that
people would have for that injury's outcome. A growing literature has
developed these values for a wide range of injuries such as the
representative nonfatal job injury, chronic bronchitis, as well as skin bums,
nerve disease, fatal cases of cancer, and nonfatal cases of cancer. 25 Our
proposed formula for punitive damages ultimately could provide guidance
for setting punitive damages for deterrence purposes in bodily injury cases
generally, not just those resulting in death.
25.
W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1912, 194142 tbl.7 (1993).
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III. SETTING DAMAGES FOR DETERRENCE
The deterrence function of damages depends on all forms of damages
that are paid. Thus, the fundamental issue is whether the sum of punitive
damages and compensatory damages is adequate to provide incentives for
deterrence. We begin with the situation in which the harmful conduct can
be detected with certainty. Our proposal, which is developed below, is the
following: To achieve efficient levels of deterrence in cases of wrongful
death, compensatory damages plus punitive damages should equal the VSL
in situations in which punitive damages are warranted. If the value of
compensatory damages is insufficient to establish this equality, it should be
done by raising only the level of punitive damages, with no increase in the
compensatory damages value. Compensatory damages should serve their
intended function of compensation and should not be conflated with the
deterrencefunction ofpunitive damages.
Compensatory damages consist of compensation for financial loss,
often referred to as economic damages, and compensation for noneconomic
losses such as pain and suffering and mental distress.2 6 The thrust of our
argument with respect to compensatory damages for wrongful death is that
such damages are targeted at the loss suffered by the survivors, such as lost
earnings, medical expenses, and grief.27 These are the types of loss that the
deceased would have valued from the standpoint of insurance. This
compensation level, however, will fall short of a "make whole" amount.28
It is the inadequacy of financial payments to fully compensate for
noneconomic harms that will be the main factor that distinguishes cases
involving only property damage from those involving bodily injury.
We point out at this juncture that our formula equating the VSL to the
sum of punitive damages and compensatory damages can be refined to
reflect case characteristics that are different from those of an average
fatality. Here we consider two sources of refinement pertaining to the level
of economic loss. The first variation is that in some cases, substantial
medical expenses may have been incurred before death. In this situation,
the optimal deterrence amount can be increased to include these expenses.
26. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Flawed Hedonic Damages Measure of Compensationfor Wrongful
Death and Personal Injury, 20 J. FORENSIC ECON. 113, 118-21 (2007). Noneconomic pain and
suffering damages comprise a substantial percentage of compensatory damages awards. 2 AM. LAW
INST., ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 199-201 (1991) [hereinafter ENTERPRISE
RESPONSIBILITY].

27.
28.

See Viscusi, supra note 26, at 118-21.
See id. at 120-21.

2010]

SAVING LIVES THROUGH PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Thus, the sum of compensatory damages and punitive damages would
equal the VSL plus medical costs.
A second complication occurs when wrongful death victims have very
high income levels. Yet heterogeneity in income can be accommodated by
recognizing a variation in the VSL with income levels. Economic research,
which has been formally recognized in Department of Transportation VSL
guidelines,2 9 has shown that the VSL rises less than proportionally in
relation to income levels. For instance, a 10 percent increase in a person's
income level will boost the VSL by only 5-6 percent. 30 Recognition of
income heterogeneity in setting damages would set the income-specific
VSL equal to the sum of compensatory damages and punitive damages.
Note that it is not appropriate to also increase the compensatory damages
amount (which already reflects the level of income) to account for a higher
level of income. Doing so would be double counting, as the influence of
income differences is already accounted for in the adjusted VSL level.
Although distinguishing VSL differences by income groups is
feasible, to our knowledge most government agencies do not account for
such heterogeneity. 3' Matters may be different for the courts, however,
which have a tradition of basing economic damages on the victim's
prospects rather than on the average for the
earnings history and future
32
whole.
a
as
population
We now resume discussion of our basic proposal. Compensatory
damages in a wrongful death case will consist of a conventional economic
damages component, as well as a noneconomic damages component that is
less precise. Such an approach was used in disbursing the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001. Economic damages typically consist
of medical expenses and the present value of the deceased's lost earnings,
net of the deceased's consumption from that earnings amount. Thus, the
focus is on the income loss to the survivors, or what might be viewed as an
insurance value for the financial loss. The noneconomic loss component
consists of compensation for the pain and suffering of the deceased and
29. Duvall & Gribbin Memo, supra note 3 (citing income elasticities of VSL based on Viscusi &
Aldy, supra note 15).
30. Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 15, at 40.
31.
See Viscusi, supra note 2, at 109. Based on the authors' knowledge, the Department of
Transportation is the only agency to take such income heterogeneity into account.
32. Tort law generally provides for recovery of lost earnings. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW
OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 8.3(1), at 423 (2d ed. 1993).
33. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 23, at 30-43 (detailing the factors considered in calculating
economic and noneconomic damages).
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compensation to the family for the loss. Unlike the situation of property
damage, however, there is no expectation that the compensation will fully
compensate the victim for the loss.
The dangers of overcompensating for wrongful death are clear in
contexts such as product safety, where a customer buys a potentially
dangerous product. Expected tort liability costs will raise the product price
because the consumer is buying, in effect, a bundled commodity that also
includes the product-risk insurance provided by the tort system. 34 A
worthwhile thought experiment is to ask what type of insurance policy the
customer would want to accompany the product. Because death or a serious
disabling injury will reduce the extent to which the customer can derive
utility from money, less than full insurance will generally be preferred.35
The cost of whatever insurance is provided as a package with the product
through the tort liability system will be passed on to the consumer through
higher prices such that excessive insurance will not be attractive. In effect,
routine compensation of victims of wrongful death based on the VSL will
force them to buy an insurance policy that they do not value.
But if the compensatory damages are restricted to what is desirable
from an insurance standpoint, there will be inadequate incentives for
deterrence. The solution is that situations in which there is a need to foster
deterrence are those in which punitive damages have a fundamental role to
play. Thus, compensatory damages will suffice for cases in which the
insurance objective is paramount; if deterrence is the central concern,
however, incorporating the VSL into punitive damages will be warranted.
While the VSL is a sound economic approach to establishing
incentives for deterrence, it is not an appropriate approach for setting
compensatory damages. Applying the VSL to establish the noneconomic
damages component of compensatory damages, or the loss of enjoyment of
life, has come to be known as the "hedonic damages value." Recently,
Posner and Sunstein have also advocated the use of the VSL as a
36
compensatory damages measure.
34. This is the standard economic theory for the effect of tort liability costs on prices. See Paul
H. Rubin, John E. Calfee & Mark F. Grady, BMW v. Gore: Mitigating the Punitive Economics of
Punitive Damages, in 5 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 179, 188 (Harold Demsetz, Ernest Gellhorn & Nelson
Lund eds., 1997) (discussing the effect of punitive damages on product prices).
35. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
36. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 587-90. Courts have, however, widely rejected use of
hedonic damages for compensation. See Ireland, supra note 4, at 190. Below we will show that
Polinsky and Shavell adopt a fairly similar approach in their punitive damages formulation for personal
injury cases. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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Our advocacy of increasing reliance on the VSL, but restricting its
role to punitive damages contexts, is quite different from the compensatory
damages proposal offered by Posner and Sunstein. Their proposal is a
compensatory damages formula that consists of two components 37:
conventional economic damages pertaining to the harm to survivors and the
"hedonic loss of the victim."38 Their proposal is unrelated to punitive
damages or whether punitive damages are appropriate.
The harm-to-survivors damages component in their formula is very
similar to the components of compensatory damages in wrongful death
cases. In particular, the damages amount would include compensation for
nonmonetary losses such as "grief, mental distress, loss of companionship,
and the like," as well as "the amount of money that would make the
survivor just as well off (financially) as he would have been if the death
had not occurred., 39 Their first damages component is consequently the
current compensatory damages approach for wrongful death except that
there is no compensation for the pain and suffering of the deceased.40
The other damages component, the hedonic loss, is the VSL. Much of
Posner and Sunstein's discussion explores different ways in which juries
might approach the selection of the pertinent VSL amount. They indicate
that this value could be based on government estimates of the VSL or on
juror thought experiments involving risk-money tradeoffs. 41 They also
opine that the VSL number might be tailored to the characteristics of the
deceased,42 but after death it is not feasible to run a risk-money thought
experiment to determine the willingness of the deceased to bear risk.
Because of the difficulty jurors might have in imputing a VSL, Posner and
Sunstein conclude that jurors might be provided with information on the
government's valuation. In particular, they suggest that juries could follow
43
the approach of the government and use the "standard $6 million figure.
As discussed earlier, however, there is no standard number. Even within
agencies, such as the EPA, there are some important differences in the
values used.44 Nevertheless, the government numbers are now clustering in
37. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 587.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 590.
40. id. at 584-92 (outlining their proposal, which omits mention of pain and suffering except
indirectly through the hedonic loss of the victims, or VSL). For a discussion on the role of pain and
suffering compensation, see ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 26, at 199-230.
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 587-90.
41.
42. Id. at 587.
43.

Id.

44.

See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
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a general range, 45 and experts could present testimony on the appropriate
VSL just as they do now for the standard components of economic loss.
If hedonic damages were introduced as a matter of course as an
additional component of compensation in wrongful death cases, it would
lead to a dramatic escalation in damages. As illustrated above, the VSL is
generally about an order of magnitude greater than the present value of
worker earnings.4 6 With a substantial degree of understatement, Posner and
Sunstein recognize that their proposal "would have a significant impact on
' 47
tort awards, especially for the elderly in non-hedonic-loss states. ,
The Posner-Sunstein proposal provides excessive compensation from
the standpoint of both insurance and deterrence. As indicated above, the
optimal insurance amount in terms of payment to survivors will be below
the VSL. Even if the sole objective is that of deterrence, the PosnerSunstein prescription is excessive because it adds to the VSL amount an
additional compensatory damages component-the harm to survivors. The
VSL is in itself the complete measure of the deterrence value. Government
agencies do not value statistical lives by adding to the VSL the financial
losses and other consequences associated with expected deaths; nor should
the courts.
IV. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS THEORY OF DETERRENCE
Although jury instructions do not provide precise guidance with
respect to setting punitive damages award amounts, application of law and
economics principles for efficient levels of deterrence helps to define this
task. Law and economics theories of punitive damages have focused
primarily on the influence of the probability of detection of the wrongful
conduct. The most comprehensive treatment of the law and economics
theory is that of Polinsky and Shavell.4 8 Taking into account whether the
harm involves property damage or personal injury is treated as a minor
amendment in their articulation of the law and economics theory. 49 We will
show that their amendment for wrongful death cases creates correct
deterrence incentives in punitive damages contexts but distorts the role of
compensatory damages when punitive damages are not warranted. Our
proposal eliminates the erroneous inflation of the compensatory damages
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See Viscusi, supra note 2, at 108 tbl.1, 114 tbl.2.
See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 588.
Polinsky & Shavell, supranote 6.
See id. at 941-42.
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amount that would result from their approach.
The situation we have considered thus far is that in which the
probability of detection of the harmful conduct is 1.0. While for
concreteness the discussion will be cast in terms of tortious conduct, the
principles discussed here generalize to other damages contexts as well. For
tort cases involving only property damage, there is no need to levy punitive
damages from the standpoint of deterrence, as compensatory damages
equal to the cost of the harm will suffice. 50 There may, of course, be an
additional punishment rationale. 5 1 Matters are quite different for bodily
injury cases. Unlike harms involving property loss, wrongful death cases
involve irreplaceable losses. As discussed above, compensatory damages
will not suffice in providing efficient levels of deterrence. Compensatory
damages alone will fall short because the payment to the survivors and
accident victims cannot make them whole, unlike in property damage cases
where the payment is an amount that makes the victim whole. Setting the
value of damages equal to the VSL will establish appropriate levels of
deterrence.
Because the law and economics theory has focused almost exclusively
on the property loss situation, the primary emphasis has been on the theory
of deterrence when the probability of detection is less than 1.0. Beginning
with Jeremy Bentham, analysts have observed that when the probability of
detection is less than 1.0, the expected penalty incurred by the injurer must
be increased to provide adequate deterrence.52 In particular, the total value
of punitive damages and compensatory damages should equal the value of
the harm divided by the probability of detection. In this formulation, for
cases involving only economic loss, one can express the optimal punitive
damages amount in terms of a punitive damages ratio in which economic
damages and noneconomic damages play symmetric roles.5 3 The principal
50. Id. at 873-74.
51.
Exactly how the punishment objective should enter and whether it should be added in some
way to the deterrence value is unclear. For a discussion of the punishment objective, see id. at 948-56,
and id. at 955 (indicating that the punitive damages amount should be a number between the
punishment value and the deterrence value). For a discussion of model jury instructions, see id. app.
52. The classic cite for this theory is JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 365, 401-02 (John Bowring ed., 1962) (1838-1843). Extensive modem
developments exist as well. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damagesfor Deterrence: When and
How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1143, 1149-53 (1989); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 6, at 887-96.
53. For example, let the probability of detection be less than 1.0. Assume for this case that the
value of the harm equals Economic Damages + Noneconomic Damages so that all harms can be fully
compensated through monetary payments. Penalties then establish optimal deterrence if Probability of
Detection x (Punitive Damages + Economic Damages + Noneconomic Damages) = Harm. After some
rearrangement, one finds that the punitive damages amount can be expressed in terms of the punitive
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advocates of this approach, Polinsky and Shavell, conclude: "This
discussion suggests a simple formula for assuring that injurers will pay for
the harms they cause: the total damages imposed on an injurer should
equal the harm multiplied by the reciprocal of54 the probability that the
injurerwill be found liable when he ought to be."
The same simple formula of dividing compensatory damages by the
probability of detection will not establish efficient levels of deterrence for
bodily injury cases given the current method for setting compensatory
damages. If a bodily injury case includes only financial losses or harms that
could be fully addressed with monetary compensation, then the situation
would be equivalent to that involving pure financial loss. The more
consequential situation, however, is that in which the noneconomic harms
cause fundamental welfare losses that are not equivalent to a replaceable
monetary loss, as with wrongful death. Even with a probability of detection
of 1.0, damages equal to the VSL are required to establish efficient levels
of deterrence. Adding the additional complication of a probability of
detection of less than 1.0 in no way compensates for the inadequacy of the
compensatory damages as an appropriate measure of deterrence for bodily
injury.
With a probability of detection of less than 1.0, the appropriate total
value of compensation from a deterrence standpoint is the VSL divided by
the probability of detection. This inclusion of the probability of detection
amends our damages formula to account for a probability of detection of
less than 1.0. This generalization of the law and economics formula when
the probability of detection is less than 1.0 is identical to the formula
proposed by Polinsky and Shavell in situations in which punitive damages
are warranted.
Polinsky and Shavell generally advocate raising compensatory
damages, and not simply in contexts in which punitive damages are
warranted:
We recognize, however, that the level of compensatory damages
awards in personal injury cases may be too low in practice to accomplish
proper deterrence. For example, it has been calculated that in wrongful
death cases, the amount that an injurer should pay is between $3 million
and $6 million, whereas actual awards are usually substantially lower. If
compensatory damages are too low in personal injury cases, they should
damages ratio, or (Punitive Damages / (Economic
(1 / (Probability of Detection - 1)).
54. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 6, at 889.

Damages + Noneconomic

Damages))

=
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be raised appropriately. Punitive damages should not be awarded to
correct for inadequate compensatory damages .... 55
There is a dramatic difference, however, in how our formulas will
affect the components of damages. Whereas Polinsky and Shavell propose
that compensatory damages be set so as to establish deterrence, our
proposal restricts the role of the VSL to the punitive damages component.
We propose that since deterrence concerns are the dominant focus of
punitive damages, the level of punitive damages should be increased to the
level dictated by this formula whenever the probability of detection is less
than 1.0. In contrast, Polinsky and Shavell seek to use the same formula for
both property damage cases and bodily injury cases-that is, total damages
equal the value of compensatory damages divided by the probability of
detection. To then fulfill the deterrence function, compensatory damages in
wrongful death cases must be boosted to the VSL irrespective of whether
punitive damages are warranted. While the Polinsky-Shavell proposal falls
short of the extent of damages inflation that will be generated by the
Posner-Sunstein proposal-which would also include additional
compensatory damages components for all cases-it nevertheless will
provide excessive levels of compensation in typical wrongful death cases.
It is possible to avoid these problems by not attempting to shoehorn
the punitive damages formula into the same construct for property damage
cases and bodily injury cases. Of course, there are parallels. But the
standard compensatory damages payment for property damage will play a
much different role in restoring the victim's welfare and fostering efficient
levels of deterrence than in cases of bodily injury. The solution is to have a
different, but parallel, approach for punitive damages in wrongful death
cases that provides deterrence when punitive damages are warranted
without distorting the compensatory damages approach for cases generally.
V. LEGISLATIVE CONSTRAINTS
To establish appropriate levels of deterrence using punitive damages
in cases involving wrongful death, there must be the option of raising
punitive damages to an appropriate level. Suppose that a wrongful death
case has an economic damages award of $700,000, a noneconomic
damages award of $700,000, and involves conduct that meets the pertinent
criteria for punitive damages. In order to establish appropriate deterrence
incentives through a total damages award of $9 million, there must be a
55.

Id. at 941-42 (footnotes omitted).
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punitive damages award of $7.6 million, creating a ratio of punitive
damages to compensatory damages of 5.43:1.
A punitive damages award of this magnitude is not possible if there
are legislative constraints on the permissible amount of the award. Many
states impose restrictions on the dollar amount of punitive damages, and
56
some states limit the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages.
The greatest restriction, however, is that the majority of states have a total
prohibition on punitive damages in cases involving wrongful death.57 In
our example above, such prohibitions create a $7.6 million shortfall in the
damages amount needed to create sufficient incentives to deter the
wrongful conduct that led to the death. Thus, legislative restrictions on
punitive damages for wrongful death cases undermine deterrence efforts for
the most severe personal losses.
A comparison of the deterrence and compensation objectives for
property damage cases to personal injury cases suggests that if there is ever
a basis for prohibiting punitive damages, it should be for property damage
losses rather than wrongful death. Compensatory damages for property loss
will equal the value of the harm that has been caused. Following the
standard law and economics theory, a deterrence rationale for punitive
damages in a property damage case exists only where the probability of
detecting the wrongdoing in a particular instance is less than 1.0. In
contrast, even with a probability of detection of 1.0, compensatory damages
for wrongful death will not provide adequate deterrence. The harm in
wrongful death cases causes an irreplaceable loss, and to establish the
necessary level of deterrence, the VSL should serve as the benchmark for
augmenting the compensatory damages amount through an additional
punitive damages levy.
It is true, of course, that the victim in a wrongful death case is no
longer alive and cannot enjoy spending the damages award, creating a
situation of overinsurance. But the objective of the punitive award is that of
adequate deterrence, and some compromise of the insurance objective is
inevitable when nonmonetary losses are involved. It should also be noted
that the recipients of punitive damages in a property damage case also will,
in effect, be paid an overinsurance amount. Compensatory damages ideally
are set to compensate for the financial value of the harm so that the
additional punitive damages amount will exceed the full insurance amount.
56. Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages' Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1297, 1338-46 (2005).
57. Id. at 1308.
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The overinsurance problem of punitive damages can be avoided while
retaining the deterrence incentives by making the injurer pay the punitive
damages to a government entity, such as the state, rather than to the
plaintiff. Some states have sharing provisions for punitive damages in
which the state does recoup some of the punitive damages award.58 The
practical limitation on such arrangements is that the parties can settle out of
court, enabling the plaintiff to reap some of the expected punitive damages
award payment that otherwise would have benefited the state.
In terms of a general policy proposal, we do not recommend that
punitive damages limits be imposed in either bodily injury cases or
wrongful death cases. We also conclude that the current emphasis on
limiting punitive damages awards to a greater extent for personal injury
cases than for property damage cases is clearly misplaced.
VI. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S LIMITATIONS ON PUNITIVE
DAMAGES RATIOS
Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have not banned punitive
damages awards, but rather have focused on the ratio of punitive damages
to compensatory damages as an index of the reasonableness of the punitive
damages award. Although the damages formulas proposed by the Supreme
Court differ from the Polinsky-Shavell formula, the approaches similarly
attempt to articulate a broadly applicable formula irrespective of case type.
This Article will show that it is misguided to adopt a one-ratio-fits-all-cases
approach to thinking about the appropriate ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages.
Our proposed punitive damages formula can be expressed in terms of
a ratio, but the ratio has no reasonable upper limit. The formula is as
follows: Punitive Damages + Compensatory Damages = VSL can be
expressed in ratio form as Punitive Damages / Compensatory Damages =
(VSL / Compensatory Damages) - 1. If, for instance, the VSL is ten times
the value of compensatory damages, then the ratio equals 9:1. Different
VSL levels and compensatory damages amounts for different cases,
however, can lead to higher or lower ratio values.
Using the amount of compensatory damages as a yardstick for
assessing the reasonableness of punitive damages is only appropriate if
compensatory damages serve as an accurate measure of the value of the
harm and if all types of harm are captured adequately by the compensatory
58.

Id. at 1350.
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damages amount. We believe that the compensatory damages measure is
not a pertinent measure for bodily injury cases and that it is too aggregative
a reference point for determining the necessary level of punitive damages
for deterrence purposes. The total value of compensatory damages
homogenizes the different types of harm involved and abstracts from the
composition of damages and the nature of the harm. Recognizing the role
of the different damages components and whether the case involves bodily
injury is essential to setting punitive damages amounts that will achieve
efficient levels of deterrence. While there has long been recognition in the
punitive damages literature and by the Court of factors that may influence
the appropriate level of a punitive damages award-such as the influence
of the probability of detection-the composition of damages has been
given insufficient attention in the quest for simple rules of thumb for
evaluating the reasonableness of punitive damages awards.
Several Supreme Court cases have addressed the role of the punitive
damages ratio, but the first summary statement of the visible role of the
ratio in determining the reasonableness of punitive damages awards was in
BMW of North America v. Gore.5 9 In that decision, the Court observed that
"perhaps [the] most commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or
excessive punitive damages award is its ratio to the actual harm inflicted on
the plaintiff."6 Previous Supreme Court decisions had also discussed the
reasonableness of the punitive damages award in terms of a ratio, with the
Court finding that a ratio of 4:1 was not constitutionally improper. 6 1 A
subsequent decision in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.
upheld a judgment in which the ratio was 526:1.62 Thus, while the U.S.
Supreme Court often focused on punitive damages ratios in assessing the
appropriateness of the punitive damages award, throughout the 1990s there
was little guidance as to which ratios were appropriate.
This lack of firm guidance did not persist as the Supreme Court
subsequently imposed substantial structural constraints on punitive
damages ratios. In its 2003 decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Court selected a single-digit reference point
as the appropriate upper limit on the ratio: "Our jurisprudence and the
principles it has now established demonstrate, however, that, in practice,
few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
59.
60.
61.
62.

BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
Id. at 580.
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993).
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compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process." 63
There could, of course, be exceptions to the single-digit ratio limit.
For cases with very large amounts of compensatory damages, the Court
indicated that a lower ratio may be appropriate: "When compensatory
damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to
compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process
guarantee." 64 At the opposite end of the compensatory damages spectrum,
if the compensatory damages amount is small, then a large ratio might be
acceptable: "Nonetheless, because there are no rigid benchmarks that a
punitive damages award may not surpass, ratios greater than those we have
previously upheld may comport with due process where 'a particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic
65
damages."
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Supreme Court expressed concern
over the unpredictability of punitive damages awards. 66 But the presence of
such unpredictability is not surprising given the imprecision of jury
instructions. Unlike the guidance offered by the Court in Gore, jury
instructions do not frame the issue in precise mathematical terms or as a
task involving the selection of a ratio. Rather, the jury is instructed that
factors such as the recklessness of the behavior, malicious conduct,
outrageous behavior, and exceptional blameworthiness are to be
considered; how they should be considered is not specified. 67 As a result,
studies have found that while juries are able to reach a consensus on what
constitutes wrongful conduct, they are unable to systematically map these
concerns into dollar values. 68 The result is a lack of predictability in
punitive damages awards as summarized in the Exxon Shipping decision.69
Consideration of the instructions given to the jury in In re Exxon
Valdez, which ultimately became the subject of the Supreme Court's
decision in Exxon Shipping, makes it possible to trace much of the
unpredictability in punitive damages awards to the vagueness of the
63.
64.
65.
66.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v,Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
Id.
Id. (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582).
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2625-26 (2008).

67.

CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 11-14 (2002).

68. See id. at 212-14 (synthesizing controlled experimental studies on punitive damages that
found that mock jurors reached a consensus on the blameworthiness of behavior but there was
substantial variability in assigning a punitive damages penalty for such conduct).
69. Exxon Shipping, 128 S.Ct. at 2625-26. As indicated in footnote seventeen of the decision,
the Court declined to rely on SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 67, because that study was funded in part by
Exxon. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2626 n.17.
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guidance. Consistent with the usual concern that punitive damages foster
the objectives of deterrence and retribution, the instructions outline the
general purposes of punitive damages: "The purposes for which punitive
damages are awarded are: (1) to punish a wrongdoer for extraordinary
misconduct; and (2) to warn defendants and others and deter them from
70
doing the same."
The guidance provided in In re Exxon Valdez with respect to setting
the magnitude of punitive damages involves little more than suggesting that
the jury set a "reasonable" damages amount:
[T]he amount of punitive damages may not be determined arbitrarily.
You must use reason in setting the amount. ... [A]ny punitive damages
award must have a rational basis in the evidence in the case. A punitive
damages award may not be larger than an amount that bears a reasonable
relationship to the harm caused to members of the plaintiff class by a
defendant's misconduct .... Also, the award may not be larger than what
is reasonably necessary to achieve society's goals of punishment and
deterrence.

71

With respect to the deterrence objective of punitive damages, the
instructions do little more than restate the objective and do not indicate
how a monetary damages figure might be selected. The instructions direct
the jury to think about "whether an award of punitive damages is
appropriate in this case, and, if so, in what amount" and to "consider steps
recurrence of the conduct in question-in
taken by a defendant to prevent
72
spill."
oil
this case, another
But what is the optimal deterrence value for future behavior? To what
extent do compensatory damages not suffice? If they do not suffice, what is
the extent of the shortfall? Should the jury be thinking in terms of the
punitive damages ratio, a matter which is not addressed at all in jury
instructions but has loomed large in court decisions? The instructions are
silent on such fundamental concerns. 73
In its decision in Exxon Shipping, which addresses the punitive
damages award after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Supreme Court
established a stricter upper limit on the punitive damages ratio for maritime
70. In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1049 n.14 (D. Alaska 2002) (quoting Jury
Instruction No. 22).
71. Id. at 1049 n.16 (quoting Jury Instruction No. 25).
72. Id. at 1050 n.21 (quoting Jury Instruction No. 35).
73. The U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska, in its decision in In re Exxon Valdez,
stressed the importance of adequate instructions: "Without proper instructions, jury verdicts are patently
suspect." Id. at 1054.
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cases such as the Exxon case. The Court's reasoning was based on
empirical evidence regarding award distribution in samples of state court
verdicts. Based on its review of cases, for which the median ratio in state
courts was around 0.65:1, the Court developed its punitive damages ratio
guidepost:
On these assumptions, a median ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages of about 0.65:1 probably marks the line near which cases like
this one largely should be grouped. Accordingly, given the need to
protect against the possibility (and the disruptive cost to the legal
system) of awards that are unpredictable and unnecessary, either for
deterrence or for measured retribution, we consider that a 1:1 ratio,
which 4is above the median award, is a fair upper limit in such maritime
cases.

7

The Court also sought to reconcile the 1:1 ratio with its more lenient
guidance in the State Farm decision by, in effect, indicating that the Exxon
Shipping decision was a direct application of State Farm's guidance: "In
State Farm, we said that a single-digit maximum is appropriate in all but
the most exceptional of cases, and '[w]hen compensatory damages are
substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory
75
damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.'
The increasing prominence of the 1:1 ratio in the Court's assessments
of punitive damages awards was sufficiently noteworthy that Justice
Ginsburg expressed her concern that this more restrictive ratio would be
applied to a broader set of cases:
In the end, is the Court holding only that 1:1 is the maritime-law ceiling,
or is it also signaling that any ratio higher than 1:1 will be held to exceed
"the constitutional outer limit"? On next opportunity, will the Court rule,
due process requires in all of the
definitively, that 1:1 is the ceiling
76
States, and for all federal claims?
Despite the 1:1 ratio providing a new reference point for determining
the acceptability of punitive damages awards, the Court recognized that
factors such as a low probability of detection or malicious conduct could
also affect the appropriate magnitude of the award. 77 How such additional
74. Exxon Shipping, 128 S.Ct. at 2633 (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 2634 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003)).
76. Id.at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
77. Id. at 2633 (majority opinion) ("In a well-functioning system, we would expect that awards at
the median or lower would roughly express jurors' sense of reasonable penalties in cases with no
earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness within the punishable spectrum (cases like this one, without
intentional or malicious conduct, and without behavior driven primarily by desire for gain, for example)
and cases (again like this one) without the modest economic harm or odds of detection that have opened
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factors should enter, and to what extent, is not specified. The guidance
focuses primarily on the 1:1 punitive damages ratio.
The 1:1 ratio has begun to be adopted by other courts as the
appropriate guide for determining the upper limit on punitive damages
awards. For example, the Third Circuit ordered a 1:1 ratio in a medical
liability insurer case, 78 and the Sixth Circuit imposed a 1:1 upper ratio limit
in an age discrimination case. 79 One would expect the Supreme Court's
upper ratio limit to have profound effects because it provides a precise
reference point for otherwise murky determinations. Notwithstanding the
precision of the ratio approach, this Article will show that uniform
application of such ratios to assess the appropriateness of a punitive
damages award is fundamentally flawed.
Particularly for bodily injury cases, compensatory damages generally
will not provide for an adequate level of deterrence. To achieve efficient
deterrence levels for injury cases involving catastrophic harm to individual
welfare, such as wrongful death, it will often be necessary to impose
damages amounts that generate punitive damages ratios in excess of 1:1, as
with the ratio of 5.43:1 in the illustrative example in Part V. Indeed, the
ratio amount is not the main matter of interest. The nature and the extent of
the harm surely are consequential, but compensatory damages alone may
not reflect the extent of the harm. What is pertinent for purposes of
deterrence is not the punitive damages ratio but the total amount of
damages, including losses that may not have been monetized through
compensatory damages. For purposes of assessing these total damages, we
have presented a formula that is more precise than the various upper
bounds on permissible ratios and will also generate incentives for efficient
levels of deterrence. If other considerations enter, such as a low probability
of detection or a retribution objective, then the appropriate level of
damages payments may be even greater.
VII. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES BY CASE
TYPE
To explore how punitive damages awards currently vary by case type
and with respect to the composition of damages, our empirical analysis
uses data from the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts ("CJSSC") 2005.80
the door
78.
79.
80.

to higher awards.").
Jurinko v. Med. Protective Co., 305 F. App'x 13, 27-30 (3d Cir. 2008).
Morgan v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 559 F.3d 425, 441-43 (6th Cir. 2009).
The description of the CJSSC data and the data used in the empirical analysis is based on the
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The CJSSC provides cross-sectional data for a nationally representative
sample of tort, contract, and real property cases tried to verdict in selected
counties in state courts for the year 1992 (jury trials only), 8 and for the
years 1996, 2001, and 2005 (both jury and bench trials).82 In each available
year, the survey collected data on total compensatory damages awards (if
any) and, when relevant, punitive damages awards. 83 In 2005, for the first
time, the survey separately reported total compensatory, economic, and
noneconomic damages awards. 84 We therefore use the 2005 data to
examine whether the components of compensatory awards, rather than
simply the total compensatory awards, affect punitive damages awards, and
whether the relationships between specific components of compensatory
damages and punitive damages differ according to whether the case
involves bodily injury or not.
Department of Justice's description of the study. See CJSSC 2005: Codebook, supranote 11.
81. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Justice Survey of State Courts,
1996: Description, at ii (Sept. 18, 2000), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/
studies/2883?archive=ICPSR [hereinafter CJSSC 1996: Description] (noting that the 1996 study
expanded on the 1992 study by including both bench and jury trials).
82. The sampling frame is a two-stage stratified sampling process. For the 1992, 1996, and 2001
waves of data, the following sampling frame was used: In the first stage, the seventy-five most
populous counties were identified. In the second stage, forty-five or forty-six of these counties were
selected for inclusion in the study. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Justice
1992: Description, at iii (Oct. 1, 1996), available at
Survey of State Courts,
(sampling
forty-five
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/6587?archive=ICPSR
counties); CJSSC 1996: Description, supra note 81, at ii (sampling forty-five counties); Bureau of
Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2001: Description, at iii
available
at
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/
28,
2004),
(May
3957?archive=ICPSR (sampling forty-six counties). For the 2005 wave of data, the survey preserved
the earlier sampling frame by sampling forty-six counties from the seventy-five most populous
counties, but also sampled from 110 additional counties outside the seventy-five most populous
counties. See CJSSC 2005: Codebook, supra note 11, at 10-12; Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2005: Description, at ii-iv (Jan. 14, 2009), available at
[hereinafter
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/23862?archive=ICPSR&q=23862
CJSSC 2005: Description]. The total number of cases included in the 2005 sample was 8872. CJSSC
2005: Codebook, supra note 11, at 6.
83. See CJSSC 2005: Description, supra note 82, at ii-iv. For articles using the first three waves
of the CJSSC data, see generally Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages:
Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263 (2006) (analyzing CJSSC 1992, 1996, and 2001 studies); Joni Hersch &
W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages by Numbers: Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
(llya Somin & Todd J. Zywicki eds., forthcoming 2010) (discussing the Exxon Shipping Court's use of
1992, 1996, and 2001 data); Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries
Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004) (using CJSSC 1996 data to demonstrate that juries and judges
differ in awarding punitive damages); and Thomas H. Cohen, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Punitive Damage
Awards in Large Counties, 2001 (Mar. 2005) (analyzing CJSSC 2001 data).
84. See CJSSC 2005: Codebook, supra note 11, at II (describing variables for the various
different damages figures).
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For purposes of the following analysis, we make the following sample
restrictions: (1) the winning party is the plaintiff, and (2) the plaintiff is
awarded positive punitive damages and positive compensatory damages.
fifty-four involve
There are 180 cases meeting these criteria. Of these,
85
bodily injury, and 126 do not involve bodily injury.
In twenty-four of the 180 punitive damages cases, information on the
breakdown between economic and noneconomic damages is not reported.
As our main interest is in examining the relationship between components
of compensatory damages awards and punitive damages, most of our
analyses are based on the 156 cases reporting the breakdown. Of these,
forty-four involve bodily injury, and 112 do not involve bodily injury.
Table 1 summarizes the average damages amounts for different case
categories, as well as the average punitive damages ratio for the full
86
The
sample, and by whether or not the case involved bodily injury.
87
weights.
reported values are adjusted to account for the sample
Panel A reports the results for the full sample of 156 cases with
positive values of punitive damages. On average, the economic damages
are $1.04 million, the noneconomic damages are $0.25 million, and the
punitive damages are $1.67 million. The average of the punitive damages
ratios across all cases is 3.67:1, which is substantially higher than the 1:1
guideline in Exxon Shipping, but well within the single-digit guideline in
88
State Farm.
85. Cases not involving bodily injury will also be referred to as property damage cases.
86. The authors' calculations come from CJSSC 2005. The sample is comprised of cases in
which the plaintiff won, punitive damages were awarded, compensatory damages were greater than
zero, and the breakdown of compensatory damages into economic damages and noneconomic damages
was reported. The numbers of observations are as follows: 156 (panel A), 44 (panel B), and 112 (panel
C). In the 2005 CJSSC data set, case type is reported in twenty-six categories. See CJSSC 2005:
Codebook, supra note 11, at 21-22. We group case types into the eleven categories reported in the
table. See infra tbl.1.
87. The weights are built into the CJSSC study to account for the sample not being a simple
random sample. See CJSSC 2005: Codebook, supra note I1, at 13.
88. Note that the average ratio figures pertain to the average value of the individual punitive
damages ratios across all cases, which does not equal the value of the average punitive damages award
divided by the average value of compensatory damages.
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TABLE 1. Damages Values by Case Type
Case Type

Average
Economic
Damages
(Dollars)

Average
Noneconomic
Damages
(Dollars)

Average
Punitive
Damages
(Dollars)

Average
Punitive
Damages
Ratio

Panel A: Full Sample
Motor Vehicle
Tort

1,132,183

942,728

518,753

1.00

Premises Tort

584,856

0

877,778

1.51

Products
Liability

317,901

4,250,000

2,000,000

0.44

Intentional
Tort

237,497

179,101

246,918

1.47

Malpractice

3,563,173

756,040

6,775,982

2.90

Slander

1,314,081

479,647

1,440,264

2.56

Other Tort

3,050,744

950,741

6,364,211

1.84

Fraud

289,531

22,346

404,355

7.71

Seller-Buyer

61,329

2895

156,858

3.71

Employment

2,922,965

307,187

6,095,789

1.18

Other
Contracts

2,495,639

362

6,467,090

4.95

All Cases

1,039,521

253,680

1,673,952

3.67

Panel B: Bodily Injury Cases
Motor Vehicle
Tort

2,255,262

993,144

543,084

1.00

Premises Tort

584,856

0

877,778

1.51

Products
Liability

317,901

4,250,000

2,000,000

0.44

Intentional
Tort

258,455

190,639

233,006

0.91

Malpractice

2,356,768

887,526

5,345,718

3.16

Other Tort

4,203,089

1,665,010

6,513,569

2.09

All Cases

1,542,899

713,488

1,285,506

1.18
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Panel C: No Bodily Injury Cases
13,867

75,000

100,000

1.13

25,708

62,500

387,500

7.15

10,500,000

0

15,000,000

1.43

Slander

1,314,081

479,647

1,440,264

2.56

Other Tort
Fraud

1,528,005
289,531

6888
22,346

6,166,844
404,355

1.51
7.71

Seller-Buyer
Employment

61,329
2,922,965

2895
307,187

156,858
6,095,789

3.71
1.18

Other
Contracts

2,495,639

362

6,467,090

4.95

849,352

79,972

1,820,701

4.61

Motor Vehicle
Tort
Intentional
Tort
Malpractice

All Cases

There is considerable heterogeneity across case types in the level of
damages and in the punitive damages ratio. Some case groupings, such as
fraud cases and contract cases involving sellers or buyers, have total
damages amounts that are relatively small and far below the average for all
punitive damages cases. These case groupings, however, have somewhat
large average punitive damages ratios: 7.71:1 for fraud and 3.71:1 for
seller-buyer cases. Other case types with large average punitive damages
ratios include other contracts, with a ratio of 4.95:1; malpractice, with a
ratio of 2.90:1; and slander, with a ratio of 2.56:1.89
Panels B and C of table 1 stratify the full sample of cases with positive
punitive damages into two groups-panel B reports descriptive statistics
for the subset of cases involving bodily injury, while panel C summarizes
the statistics for the subset of cases involving no bodily injury. As a
consequence, any case type where there is no bodily injury, such as slander,
does not appear in panel B. Compared to the cases without bodily injury,
the bodily injury cases have, on average, a greater share of noneconomic
damages as compared to punitive damages. In addition, both the average
amount of punitive damages and the average punitive damages ratio are
90
less for bodily injury cases than for cases without bodily injury. If
punitive awards for personal injury cases are to deter irreplaceable health
89.
90.

See supra tbl. 1, panel A.
See supra tbl.1, panels B & C.
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losses, one might have expected a larger role for punitive damages in the
bodily injury context. The observed differences could be due to state
legislative restrictions on punitive damages awards in bodily injury cases,
or to the fact that the economic loss is a more accurate reflection of the
harm in property damage cases.
As indicated in panel C of table 1, for the most part, noneconomic
damages do not play a substantial role in cases without bodily injury. The
main exceptions are slander and employment cases. 91 The economic
damages amounts and the punitive damages amounts, however, can be
quite large. Five of the nine property damage case types have average
punitive damages of at least $1 million. Every property damage case type
has an average punitive damages ratio of at least 1:1, and several categories
have fairly high ratios, such as fraud and intentional tort.9 2 To the extent
that these case types involve behavior that is viewed as malicious or
particularly egregious, it may be that even large ratios such as these would
not be inconsistent with the guidelines provided by the Supreme Court in
93

Exxon Shipping.

To see whether there is a shortfall in punitive damages for bodily
injury cases from the standpoint of deterrence, it is instructive to focus on
punitive damages cases in which there was a claim of wrongful death. Here
we focus on two extreme wrongful death cases from the 2005 CJSSC. 94
These cases will be useful in illustrating how the VSL figure can be used to
assess the adequacy of the punitive damages award. In each instance, we
assume that the probability of detection is 1.0.
At the low end of the awards spectrum is an intentional tort case
involving wrongful death, with compensatory damages of $118,000 and
punitive damages of $82,000. Thus, the punitive damages ratio in this case
is 0.69:1, which is well within the single-digit ratio of State Farm, and
indeed is well within the 1:1 ratio of Exxon Shipping. There is a problem,
however, of substantial underdeterrence. Based on our proposal, let us
assume that $9 million is the pertinent VSL for optimal deterrence.95 Then,
for total damages to equal the VSL,9 6 the punitive damages award should
91.
92.
93.

See supra tbl.1, panel C.
See supra tbl.1, panel C.
See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.

94. The data set includes a total of seven wrongful death cases with positive punitive damages
awards, of which three are intentional torts, three are medical malpractice, and one is a motor vehicle
tort.
95.

See supra Part II.

96.

See supra Part III.
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be increased to $8.882 million, generating a punitive damages ratio of
75.27:1.
The largest punitive damages award for a wrongful death case in the
2005 CJSSC data set is $18 million in a medical malpractice case. The
compensatory damages award in this case was $1.481 million. Because this
compensatory damages value is suggestive of a typical wrongful death
victim rather than one with unusually high earnings, using a VSL of $9
million may be appropriate. 97 An efficient deterrence level consequently
would result from a punitive damages award of $7.519 million, far less
than the $18 million that was levied.98 The actual punitive damages award
in this case, at a ratio of 12.15:1, also exceeds the single-digit punitive
damages ratio guidelines.
VIII. MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
How do economic and noneconomic damages amounts affect the level
of punitive damages awarded? If punitive damages are set in the same
manner as the U.S. Supreme Court has conceptualized the task, then it is
the ratio of punitive damages to total compensatory damages that is the
determining consideration. Under such an approach, the components of
compensatory damages do not enter the calculation. Under this approach,
economic and noneconomic damages should have equal roles in
influencing the punitive damages amount. Whether there is such
equivalence can be evaluated statistically using the CJSSC data.
Our hypothesis is that economic and noneconomic damages will not
have equal roles in influencing the punitive damages amount and that the
influence of economic and noneconomic damages will differ according to
whether the case involves bodily injury or not. The irreplaceable harm in
severe bodily injury cases goes beyond the monetary compensation for
noneconomic loss. 99 The size of the noneconomic loss component may
serve as a measure of the physical harm, as bodily injury cases with larger
noneconomic damages components are presumably those in which the
97. For example, this does not appear to be a case with extraordinarily large medical expenses or
a case in which the present value of the net earnings loss is extremely large. Complications such as
these would warrant an adjustment in the target VSL level.
98. The authors' proposed $7.519 million punitive damages award would yield a punitive
damages ratio of 5.08:1, well within the single-digit punitive damages ratio guidelines.
99. This relationship follows from the fact that severe bodily injuries lower the marginal utility
of income and hence the degree to which money can compensate for the welfare loss. See supra notes
7-8 and accompanying text.
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noneconomic harm is greater. Thus, one might expect empirically that
across all bodily injury cases, higher levels 00
of noneconomic damages in
damages.'
punitive
of
level
the
boost
will
turn
To explore these relationships, we estimate a multiple regression
model specifying a simple linear relationship between punitive damages
and the compensatory damages components. Thus, Punitive Damages =
Constant + (b x (Economic Damages)) + (c x (Noneconomic Damages)) +
Error Term, where the constant term and the coefficients b and c are
estimated. The coefficients have a straightforward interpretation-on
average, each additional dollar of economic damages raises punitive
damages by $b, and similarly, on average each additional dollar of
noneconomic damages raises punitive damages by $c. In this linear
version, if b and c are identical, then each dollar of economic damages has
the same effect on punitive damages as each dollar of noneconomic
damages. This equivalence is the assumption underlying the use of punitive
damages ratios as a reference point.
The statistical analysis of each of these equations will be undertaken
for the full sample of punitive damages cases, as well as separately for
cases involving bodily injury and cases not involving bodily injury.10' Our
hypothesis is that the noneconomic damages variable will have a greater
effect on punitive damages for bodily injury cases, as these noneconomic
damages likely serve as a measure of the irreplaceable health loss that is
incurred.
Table 2 reports the three punitive damages regressions. 0 2 The results
for punitive damages cases in general indicate that each damages
component has a similar incremental effect. On average, each additional
dollar of economic damages raises punitive damages by $1.19 for the full
100. Note that based on our proposed theory of punitive damages, if the level of harm is held
constant and restricted to wrongful death cases, then higher levels of noneconomic damages should
reduce the level of punitive damages that are required for the total damages amount to equal the VSL.
101.
Tests for influential observations indicated that the four observations in the sample with
compensatory damages greater than $25 million were influential and that inclusion of these
observations distorted the relation between damages components and punitive damages. Thus, we drop
these four observations from the regression analysis. "An observation is said to be influential if
removing the observation substantially changes the estimate of coefficients." UCLA Academic
Technology Services, Stata Web Books: Regression with Stata, http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/
webbooks/reg/chapter2/statareg2.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).
102. The authors' calculations come from CJSSC 2005. The sample is comprised of cases in
which the plaintiff won, punitive damages were awarded, compensatory damages were greater than zero
and less than $25 million, and the breakdown of compensatory damages into economic damages and
noneconomic damages was reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and are based on
probability weights using the variable "BWGTO."
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sample punitive damages regression, and each additional dollar of
noneconomic damages boosts punitive damages by $1.14.103 The Supreme
Court's reasoning in terms of a punitive damages ratio in which economic
damages and noneconomic damages values are combined into a
compensatory damages amount with equal weights is broadly consistent
with this award pattern.
TABLE 2. Punitive Damages
Punitive Damages Amount
Full Sample

Economic
Damages

1.194**
(0.457)

Noneconomic
Damages

1.144**
(0.438)

Regressions-Dependent
Bodily Injury

0.585**
(0.036)

Variable:

No Bodily Injury

2.158**
(0.616)

0.376 x 106**
(0.162 × 106)

1.500**
(0.547)
0.229 x 106*
(0.122 x 106)

(0.108 x 106)

R'

0.48

0.57

0.68

N

152

42

110

Constant

1.145**
(0.254)
0.112 x 106

* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, two-tailed test

Focusing on the full sample regression masks the quite different
processes that govern the setting of punitive damages awards for bodily
injury cases and property damage cases. For cases involving bodily injury,
the magnitude of the relation between noneconomic damages and punitive
damages is nearly three times the relation between economic damages and
punitive damages. On average, each additional dollar of noneconomic
damages boosts punitive damages by $1.50, while each additional dollar of
economic damages boosts punitive damages by $0.59.1"4
The opposite pattern is exhibited for cases not involving bodily
injury-each additional dollar of economic damages raises punitive
damages by $2.16, while each additional dollar of noneconomic damages
raises punitive damages by $1.15. For property damage cases, economic
105
damages affect punitive damages more than noneconomic damages.
These findings have three principal ramifications for the Supreme
Court's focus on punitive damages ratios. First, the current process for
103.
104.
105.

See infra tbl.2.
See supra tbl.2.
See supra tbl.2.
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setting punitive damages is not driven by a symmetric markup of economic
damages and noneconomic damages, as would be observed if the concern
of juries and judges was simply with establishing a ratio of punitive
damages to compensatory damages rather than taking into account the
components of damages. Second, for bodily injury cases, the greater
influence of noneconomic damages than economic damages on the amount
of punitive damages is consistent with what might be expected from the
standpoint of an economic theory of deterrence. Compensatory damages do
not provide fully adequate deterrence in bodily injury cases, and boosting
punitive damages based on the noneconomic damages amount is consistent
with providing adequate deterrence. That noneconomic damages have a
larger estimated effect on punitive damages for bodily injury cases than for
property damage cases is also consistent with this optimal deterrence
approach. Third, the relatively larger role of economic damages in driving
the punitive damages amount for property damage cases is not consistent
with a deterrence hypothesis, as economic damages and noneconomic
damages should have a symmetric effect if losses have been converted to
equivalent financial terms.
These results are consistent with an alternative hypothesis for the way
in which punitive damages awards are being set. The observed pattern may
have little to do with attempts to foster optimal deterrence and may be
attributable to a framing effect. The relatively greater influence of
noneconomic damages in bodily injury cases and economic damages in
property damage cases suggests that the damages component that is more
central to the character of the loss has the greater effect on punitive
damages. Thus, one can view the setting of punitive damages as being
influenced by a framing effect, whereby the damages determination process
is structured in terms of the damages component that looms largest in the
particular case. What we do not observe is a process that is consistent with
the conceptualization of appropriate punitive damages amounts in terms of
punitive damages ratios. Economic and noneconomic damages are not
being summed with equal weights and then used to calculate punitive
damages based on some target punitive damages ratio.
IX. CONCLUSION: PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO ESTABLISH
DETERRENCE FOR CASES OF WRONGFUL DEATH
The task of establishing appropriate levels of deterrence in punitive
damages contexts involving wrongful death is quite well defined, despite
the nonmonetary aspect of the loss. The approach that should be taken to
establish the damages formula, however, is different from that for cases
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involving property losses. Compensatory damages for wrongful death will
not make the victim "whole," whereas monetary compensation will suffice
for property losses. Also, using the VSL as a compensatory damages
measure will not make the deceased indifferent to death and will create
problems of excessive insurance and compensation when punitive damages
are not warranted. Quite simply, property loss cases and wrongful death
cases are not symmetric and require different punitive damages
formulations.
Our proposal establishes the correct deterrence incentives by adjusting
the value of punitive damages while leaving the current compensatory
damages practices unchanged. The challenge for punitive damages then is
to address the shortfall in damages to establish appropriate levels of
deterrence. This deterrence role can be formalized by applying the VSL,
thus establishing a concrete, well-defined procedure for setting punitive
damages.
The resulting punitive damages amount may fail the commonly
applied ratio tests for reasonable punitive damages. The ratios of punitive
damages to compensatory damages may exceed 1:1 and may even go
beyond single digits. Compensatory damages and punitive damages have
quite different roles to play, and particularly in cases involving wrongful
death, the compensatory components of the loss do not capture the extent
of the harm or the financial incentives that are needed to deter similar
wrongful conduct in the future.
That punitive damages ratios are not meaningful in this context does
not imply that the courts are bereft of quantitative guidelines. The estimates
of the VSL provide a reference point for assessing the pertinent level of
damages. Rather than focusing on the ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages as the principal criterion, however, the emphasis
instead should be on the sum of punitive damages and compensatory
damages and how this amount relates to the VSL.

